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The world financial crisis was sparked off just as Belarus started 
to gradually internationalize its economy and slowly integrate into 
the global financial community. The country has so far showed a 
modest degree of integration, however, the factors through which 
world economic variations impact Belarus are not at all dependent 
on Minsk-based decision-makers, which means the only way out 
for the Belarusian authorities and economic entities is to try and 
adapt. The Belarusian administration has to come to terms with 
the inevitable while making adjustments to structural and political 
aspects, such as its commitments to society, as the crisis pushes 
Belarus towards transformations, especially, privatization. The 
ideological pressure the authorities have put on the community in 
order to legitimize the new economic model is ample proof of the 
need for reforms. 
 
 
Is the crisis “external”? 
 
The soft monetary policy pursued by the U.S. for many years with a view to encouraging 
the domestic demand and promoting money turnover has finally brought about certain 
problems. The trouble did not immediately affect Belarus, since our financial miracle has 
different origins: the gap between loan and deposit growth rates and rise in labor 
productivity is growing bigger amid the surging deficit in foreign commodity trade. 
The basis of various processes is the same, though, because the credit behavior of 
Belarus’ individuals and economic entities has ultimately matched global trends: those 
who borrow more are not any longer regarded as miserable, suspicious or unreliable. To 
live “against credit” is quite normal now, contrary to what it felt like a few years ago. As 
there is no securities market in the country, the head of state may resort to a rhetoric 
that tags the crisis as an “external” phenomenon. Meanwhile, statistically our foreign 
trade figures are all denominated in the U.S. dollar… Furthermore, we naturally border on 
the foreign world, and across this border flow commodities, money and information. It 
seems to call the crisis an “extraneous” occurrence would be the same as to breathe the 
air around us while calling atmosphere a “foreign” factor. Let’s have a better look at 
imports and exports. They have been growing over the past 14 years, and so has the 
throughput capacity of the channel, which our neighbors’ predicaments are making use of 
to crawl into Belarus. This happens through dwindling consumption of Belarusian export 
supplies or change in prices of things we traditionally import. 
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Table 1. Major foreign trade indicators, millions of U.S. dollars 
 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Commodity exports, including 4,803 7,326 15,979 24,275 
to Russia 2,185 3,710 5,716 8,879 
to the “West” (the U.S., EU) 1,776 2,927 8,919 13,054 
Commodity imports, including 5,564 8,646 16,708 28,693 
from Russia 2,965 5,605 10,118 17,205 
from the “West” (the U.S., EU) 1,887 2,576 
 
5,566 9,677 
Source: National Statistics Committee of the Republic of Belarus 
 
 
Referring to Table 1 it can be seen that in the middle of the period under review, not 
without the effects of the 1997-1998 crisis, trade tendencies reversed: exports to Russia 
went below the volume of supplies to the West, while imports from Russia started 
growing rapidly. The key reason behind the transformation was prices for crude oil and 
fertilizers. 
The constant growth in these prices brought about changes in the commodity structure of 
exports (see Table 2), and additional currency resources appeared in the country to 
partially resolve some of the domestic problems. The increase in currency proceeds 
(Table 1), inflows of cash resources from foreign migrants (their annual average number, 
in terms of the full working year, stood close to 250,000 people in the past five years), 
and the external debt growth (Table 6) have been stable enough to keep the Belarusian 
ruble strong against the U.S. dollar and consistently augment gold and foreign exchange 
reserves of the National Bank (see http://www.nbrb.by/statistics). 
 
 
Table 2. Commodity export/import structure in 2007, per cent of the total 
 
 Export  Import 
Foods and agricultural raw materials 7.5 7.9 
Other commodities (timber, construction materials, fabrics) 19.9 19.8 
Machines, equipment, and vehicles 22.3 24.7 
Mineral products and chemicals 51.3 47.6 
Source: National Statistics Committee of the Republic of Belarus 
 
The decay of the abovementioned factors will have various consequences, therefore, the 
key challenge of the crisis that Belarus is supposed to respond to is to determine the 
resultant vector of potential changes. We start with crude oil and oil products, potash 
fertilizers, natural gas and two leading economic indicators of the domestic market, 
namely, the demand for dwelling, new cars and computers (Tables 3, 5). 
 
 
Table 3. Some export/import indicators, in natural units 
 
  2000 2005 2007 
Crude oil imports, millions of tonnes 11.9 19.2 20.0 
Oil product exports, millions of tonnes 7.8 13.5 15.1 
Natural gas imports, billions of cubic meters 17.1 20.1 20.6 
Potash fertilizer exports (on the primary nutrient basis), 
thousands of tonnes 
2,840.2 4,288.7 4,354.0 
Motorcar imports, thousands of units 57.7 131.3 180.4 
Computer imports, thousands of units 1,001.6 738.1 1,747.4 
Source: National Statistics Committee of the Republic of Belarus 
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The selected indicators showed a stable growth rate. Noteworthy also is the increase in 
consumption of imported crude oil on the home market and achievement of the “ceiling” 
consumption of natural gas. 
Refined oil makes up most of Belarus’ exports (Table 2). As crude gets cheaper and 
cheaper as a result of the global crisis (Table 4), oil product prices and consumption 
volumes also go down. The country will import less crude oil and export less oil products 
(note that Russia will be receiving a bigger portion of the customs duty imposed on 
exports of oil products). 
 
 
Table 4. Crude oil prices in the past month, quarter, year, five years 
 
 
It becomes apparent that these trends are not to our good. The fact that oil is now 
cheaper, and natural gas will definitely follow suit, will hardly make it easier, because the 
reduction in the foreign trade deficit will be immediately followed by a loss in 
Belarus’ competitive power, which is in direct proportion to the difference 
between the average gas price in Europe and on the border of Belarus. The 
economic trouble of Russia’s Gazprom, the gas giant that has slipped into a colossal 
foreign debt against the value of its shares, which has dropped several times over the 
last couple of months, will scarcely prompt the gas monopoly to cut gas prices for 
Belarus. On the contrary, it is highly probable that Gazprom’s financial losses will be 
covered at the expense of neighboring countries, including Belarus. There is no chance of 
changing the structure of the fuel and energy balance overnight, either. One hope left for 
Belarus is the high ability to pay of consumers of our potash fertilizers from India, China, 
Brazil, the U.S. and Poland. Their financial soundness also depends on how fast the 
global market, and especially the main outlets for their exports – the U.S. and EU, gets 
over the crisis. 
Finally, it is due to the crisis that neighboring states have been cutting jobs. As a result, 
Belarus’ construction sector has done away with the shortage of manpower. Inflows of 
funds from migrants are getting slower. When it comes to the so-called “authoritarian 
modernization”, it has remained a phantom of the official propaganda. Now that the crisis 
arose, it is possible for sales of our not very competitive mechanical engineering products 
to expand only within the former Soviet Union, and only under barter contracts. The 
long-awaited launch of high-tech modern productions in Russia, analogous to our 
manufacturers, will be a dangerous blow on this market. 
 
 
Trap for Consumer Society: Accumulation of Debts 
 
In the meanwhile, the Belarusians have entered the mass consumption phase (Tables 3, 
5) and are now getting used to higher living standards. Mass consumption is encouraged 
by bank lending efforts. The credit market has expanded at an impressive pace over the 
past six months. Most of the borrowers are people aged 20 to 50 who had borrowed over 
10 trillion Belarusian rubles by mid-2008, about 9% of last year’s GDP. 
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Table 5. Retail lending by commercial banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Gross External Debt of the Republic of Belarus 2003 – 2007 
millions of U.S. dollars   
   01.01.2004  
01.01.200
5  
01.01.200
6  
01.01.200
7  
01.01.200
8  
Gross External Debt  4,174.9 4,935.4 5,128.2 6,844.1 12,493.5 
General Government  343.9 492.1 606.8 589.0 2,036.3 
Banks  400.7 625.8 948.3 1,486.7 2,570.8 
Other Sectors  2,853.6 3,402.5 3,219.1 4,368.0 6,782.0 
Direct Investment: 
Intercompany Lending  293.0 338.2 353.3 399.7 508.2  
Source: National Bank 
 
The debt of the central government, commercial banks and enterprises was also growing. 
With the considerable share of the corporate debt, the short-term liabilities of the 
manufacturing sector are especially threatening. Combined foreign liabilities stand close 
to U.S. $15 billion and keep growing. 
The country has declared intentions to borrow another U.S. $4 billion from Russia and 
the IMF, which, by the way, corresponds to the foreign trade deficit forecast in 2008. It 
should be noted that the evolution of the debt follows the well-known laws of discrete 
and limited resources. It means the phase, when the growth in the amount of debt and 
repayment cannot be regarded as a linear process, has finally been reached. It is clear 
from calculations that should the current growth rate remain unchanged, starting late 
next year, the size of the foreign debt will cyclically vibrate in the U.S. $17 billion-U.S. 
$20 billion range, because they will only lend us to refinance the debt we will have. If the 
borrowing pace continues long enough, the likelihood of cyclic fluctuations transforming 
into a chaotic wobble will be very strong. The government and private borrowers regulate 
the level of their liabilities and payment discipline proportionally to banks’ money supply 
and following information reports about market trends. 
The temporary measures the administration of the country is taking to mitigate the effects of the 
crisis are illustrated in the table below, which gives selected facts presented by the central bank. 
The decision of the head of state to guarantee all retail deposits with banks also belongs here. 
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         for real property acquisition                         for consumer purposes  
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Table 6. Measures taken by Belarus’ administration 
 
Refinancing Rate 
 
Valid since* Value of base refinancing rate (discount rate), % per annum 
2008 
15.10.2008 10.75 
13.08.2008 10.5 
01.07.2008 10.25 
 
Book price of precious metals in bank ingots in August and November, 
Belarusian rubles 
 Gold, per 
gram 
Silver, per 
gram 
Platinum, per 
gram 
Palladium, per 
gram 
August 1, 2008 61,986 1,164 119,146 25,691 
November 1, 
2008 
49,654 633 53,846 13,359 
 
Exchange rate of the Belarusian ruble to the U.S. dollar, euro 
 August 1 October 1 
U.S. Dollar 2,123 2,114 
Euro 3,301 2,691 
Source: National Bank 
 
Ruble-denominated deposits rose 26% in the first nine months of 2008 to 9 trillion 
Belarusian rubles and U.S. $2 billion. The temporary measures of the government were 
enough to restrain the enormous demand for foreign exchange at least for some time, 
although in some branches of economy demand exceeds supply ten times and more. 
Under the circumstances, banks are building up an “airbag” and in September alone, gold 
and foreign exchange reserves of the National Bank shrank by U.S. $700 million to U.S. 
$4.5 billion. 
 
 
What can be done? 
 
In conclusion, let’s get back to the political rhetoric around the global turmoil. It is split 
into domestic populist declarations and external pragmatic claims. We can agree with 
pragmatism. The economy minister said: “Whether fortunately or unfortunately, Belarus 
is a country that remains underdeveloped from the point of view of international financial 
institutions. Shares of our companies have never been listed by transnational bourses, so 
we will not incur any direct losses. But on the other hand, the financial crisis will have an 
indirect impact: the demand for our products is falling on the Russian and other foreign 
outlets. We can forecast an objective reduction in sales of Belarusian products. Add 
restricted access to credit resources or necessity to borrow at exorbitant rates, hence 
slower modernization and problems with floating capital replenishment1. The first 
assessments of foreign experts came in fast: Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services 
downgraded Belarus’ credit outlook to “negative”. It means the global tendency towards 
insufficiency of credit possibilities will be further deteriorated for Belarus, which will find it 
harder or more expensive to borrow. Under the circumstances, the Belarusian authorities 
still have appropriate effective instruments to use: 
                                               
1 Latvia-Belarus 2008: Price of Reforms on Belarus’ Account. Grigory Zubarev, New Radio FM 
103.2, Riga-Minsk, October 20, 2008.   
http://www.baltic-сourse.com/rus/baltija_sng/?doc=6294 
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1. Devaluation of the ruble. It would be a last-resort treatment for our administration, 
though. We reiterated in previous analyses of BISS and our partners that the stability of 
the exchange rate and people’s confidence in the national currency were among the 
foundations of the “social contract” between the administration and society. The 
microcrisis of the Belarusian-Russian relations that arose in 2006-2007 brought about a 
run on banks, a severe blow with consequences grave enough to require temporary 
loans, which could only be repaid by privatization of Velcom mobile carrier. Despite the 
fact that the worst-case scenario in the development of “external” factors (oil prices, 
demand for Belarusian exports on the Russian market and availability of credit resources) 
will make ruble depreciation inevitable, the Belarusian authorities will only turn to 
devaluation as a last resort measure. Russian Urals oil blend quotations with delivery to 
Rotterdam on December 5 dropped 14.5% to U.S. $35.6 a barrel, and to Augusta fell 
16.2% to U.S. $34.9 a barrel. The last time the Urals blend was traded below U.S. $35 
was back in July 2004. Devaluation is not even close. 
2. Liberalization of economy. It has been declared, but it needs to be substantiated and 
legitimized. The process has started de-facto, once the head of state said it was not 
worth “dreading the open market”. Paradoxically, the state leader offers such 
declarations as the U.S. elects a new president that is said to back redistribution of 
wealth. At the same time, temporary measures to curtail imports, such as the 
introduction of import markup caps, prove that full-scale liberalization is still very far. 
Concerned parties may wish to call the 100% guarantee of bank deposits of individuals 
an indication of liberal trends, as well as the U.S. $1 billion contribution to 
Belagroprombank charter capital. 
3. Privatization of state-controlled property. The poor access to credit resources and 
political inadvisability of ruble devaluation make privatization the key mechanism to 
ensure safety of the Belarusian economy. It must be emphasized that privatization is 
very likely to be held amidst a weaker demand for Belarusian assets and lower offering 
prices. 
The future of the hundred and a half enterprises, included in the list passed by 
presidential ordinance #605 and subject to special procedure of transformation into joint-
stock companies and further privatization, is getting vaguer as Russians seem to be 
losing their acquisition zeal.  
The scandalous postponement of the Belarusian-Russian summit session and decision of 
Vladimir Putin to build an oil pipeline connecting Unecha and St. Petersburg are enough 
to discourage western buyers. The room for maneuver is getting narrower, and few 
possibilities are left, like an agrarian reform (channeling of social and economic 
ambitions) or reduction in grandiose investment plans, which will otherwise be very hard 
to finance using loans. This suggests that Belarus is finally faced with the situation when 
reform becomes indispensable. The government responds by tightening control and 
offering a non-surplus budget. Like they say: “No christening yet, but preparations are 
underway.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
